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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
As has been true in the past, litigation regarding local governments consumed a significant portion of the dockets of Louisiana's appellate courts. Decisions which involved local governments arose in a
variety of contexts including litigation concerning the constitutional
prohibition against local and special laws,' election controversies, ' the
state's local option law,' the requirements for adopting municipal ordinances,' the options available to utilities owned by local governments, 5 the reach of the police power,' land use planning,7 taxing
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508 (La. 1979); State ex reL State Banking Dep't v.
Acadiana Bank and Trust Co., 360 So. 2d 846 (La. 1978). See notes 14-31, infra, and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Roe v. Picou, 361 So. 2d 874 (La. 1978) (candidate for school board
seat substantially complied with the statutory requirement that he designate "the office he seeks" despite his erroneous designation of the ward number of the seat for
which he was qualifying); Staton v. Hutchinson, 370 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978)
(candidate may contest an election on grounds that nonresidents of the local government were allowed to vote in the election when the candidate challenged the voters at
the polls but was overruled by the election commissioners).
3. Kelly v. Village of Greenwood, 363 So. 2d 887 (La. 1978) (the mere holding of a
local option election on the wrong date does not render the election void in the
absence of evidence that the result of the election would have been different had it
been held on a different date); Boykin v. Desoto Parish Police Jury, 359 So. 2d 239 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 199 (La. 1978) (local option election is upheld
where there was substantial compliance with the applicable statutory procedures).
4. Compare Rue Lafayette Mortgage Corp. v. Wenger, 366 So. 2d 1059, 1060-61
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (neither failure of mayor to sign ordinance nor failure of town
to maintain an ordinance book in accordance with statutory requirements renders the
ordinance invalid), with Merchant v. Fuselier, 365 So. 2d 854, 856 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 137 (La. 1979) (resolutions that are not signed by the
mayor are invalid). See also Merchant v. Fuselier, 365 So. 2d 852, 854 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978) (unless there is a certified copy of a city ordinance that complies with statutory
requirements, it "must be proved like any other fact").
5. Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978); Perry v. City of
Monroe, 360 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 583 (La. 1978). See
notes 32-112, infra, and accompanying text.
6. Eudy v. Jefferson Parish Council, 363 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978)
(parish council is not required to conduct a hearing or provide notice to affected
citizens before adopting an ordinance banning the sale of shrimp from trucks).
7. E.g., City of New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978). See notes
113-29, infra, and accompanying text. See also Rue Lafayette Mortgage Corp. v.
Wenger, 366 So. 2d 1059 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (prior use of land as a park for recreational vehicles did not constitute the operation of a trailer camp as that term was used
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11
authority,' public contracts," tort liability," the open meeting law,

in city zoning ordinances); Old Jefferson's Civic Ass'n v. Planning Comm'n, 364 So. 2d
193 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (planning commission must hold hearings prior to approving subdivision plats submitted by developers); State v. City of New Orleans, 360 So.
2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (highway department does not have to pay compensation when it condemns city property that has been dedicated to public use).
8. Ouachita Parish School Bd. v. Ouachita Parish Supervisors Ass'n, 362 So. 2d
1138 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978) (school supervisors were not authorized to participate in
raises funded by sales tax approved at a special election); Giraud v. City of New
Orleans, 359 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (suit for refund was the sole remedy
for challenges to changes in tax rolls that increased taxes on vacant property in New
Orleans).
9. See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Administration, 367 So. 2d
1161 (La. 1979) (governmental authority awarding bids under the public bid law must
provide notice and hearing to the low bidder on a contract before disqualifying the bidder as nonresponsible); Arnold v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 366 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1978)
(broad grant of authority allowing the Orleans Levee Board to dispose of its property
by the methods it deems proper operates to exempt the board from the requirements
of the Public Lease Law); College Assoc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 369 So. 2d 1066 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979) (even though no contract existed
between city and developers because of the lack of a meeting of the minds on price,
developers are nonetheless entitled to recover the full cost of constructing a sewer line
on a theory of unjust enrichment); Lorenz v. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 365
So. 2d 27 (La. App 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1978) (city can waive the
requirement of the public bid law that a bidder furnish a bid bond with his bid when
the omission was inadvertent and the bond was furnished on the same day as the bids
were opened). Haughton Elevator is probably the most significant of the contract decisions. Although it involves the state as a defendant, its rationale also covers local
governments that award contracts under the public bid law. For a more detailed
discussion of the decision, see Note, Shaping Specific ProceduralRequirements for
(1980).
Disqualification Under Louisiana's Public Bid.Law, 40 LA. L. REV.
10. See Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978);
Romero v. Town of Welsh, 370 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Whatley v. State,
369 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Durbin v. City of Baton Rouge, 366 So. 2d
1020 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 366 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979). These cases are discussed at notes
130-58, infra, and accompanying text. See also Williams v. London, 370 So. 2d 518 (La.
1979) (statute requiring that a plaintiff furnish bond for the attorney's fees when he
sues an elected official for any matter arising out of the performance of his public
duties is inapplicable to a suit based on an assault allegedly committed by a member of
a police jury during a police meeting); Guillotte v. Houston Gen. Ins, Co., 368 So. 2d
1026 (La. 1979) (jury did not draw an unreasonable inference when it concluded that
the plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury when she stepped over a string of
Christmas lights that were stretched across a public sidewalk); LaFleur v. City of Ville
Platte, 367 So. 2d 121.(La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 124 (La. 1979) (city is
liable for injuries plaintiffs suffered when the leg of a table at the city's community
center collapsed and the plaintiffs fell from the table top); Capers v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 365 So. 2d 23 (La. App 4th Cir. 1978) (school board not liable for injury
child suffered on school playground in the absence of negligence on the part of school
employees).
11. State v. Guidry, 364 So. 2d 589 (La. 1978) (court refuses to decide the constitutionality of the state open meeting law when all parties concede on appeal that the

19801

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979

683

and public officers 2 and employees.'3 The breadth of the issues raised
in these decisions required considerable selectivity to allow careful
analysis within reasonable space limitations. Accordingly, this article
focuses on the decisions in four areas: the constitutional prohibition
against local laws, the options available to local governments that provide utility services, the ability of local governments to control the
state's use of state-owned land, and the tort liability of local governments.
LOCAL LAWS

During the 1978-79 term, the Louisiana Supreme Court continued its recent trend of strictly enforcing the constitutional provisions pertaining to local or special legislation." State ex reL State
conduct of the defendants did not violate the statute); Morial v. Guste, 365 So. 2d 289
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978) (district court may issue a
declaratory judgment that a proposed gathering does not violate the open meeting
law).
12. Bellon v. Deshotel, 370 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (statutory prohibition
against holding two elective public offices simultaneously is constitutional); Montelepre
v. Edwards, 359 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (minimum age established for the
offices of municipal court judge requires that candidate reach the age when he
assumes office, not when he qualifies as a candidate).
13. E.g., Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 370 So. 2d 528 (La.
1979) (statute that precludes former employees from withdrawing contributions they
were required to make to police retirement system does not take private property
without due process of law nor deny the former employees equal protection of the
law); Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 367 So. 2d 849 (La. 1979) (Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize the district court to conduct a de novo
hearing when pension board fails to comply with the procedural requirements of the
Act; proper remedy is remand to agency for further proceedings); City of Kenner v.
Lawrence, 365 So. 2d 1301 (La. 1978) (city civil service board can appeal judgment
reversing its reinstatement order even though the employee ordered reinstated fails to
perfect a timely appeal); City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n of La., 369 So. 2d 188 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979) (district court can enjoin strike by municipal police officers despite
the absence of a statute declaring such strikes to be unlawful); Frazier v. Allen, 363
So. 2d 542 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978) (member of police civil service board satisfied
residency requirement of statute while he was temporarily living outside the city
while on active duty service with the military); Branighan v. Department of Police, 362
So. 2d 1221 (La. App. 4th Cir), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 247 (La. 1978) (civil service commission may not reduce the dismissal of a police officer to a suspension where the
behavior leading to the dismissal provided sufficient legal cause to sustain a dismissal);
Johnson v. Baton Rouge Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 361 So. 2d 1357 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978) (to establish his eligibility to take a promotion examination, the applicant
must show that he will meet the qualifications for the job he is seeking when the position will become vacant, not at the time he applies to take the examination).
14. LA. CONST. art. III, §§ 12-13. For a summary of the Louisiana constitutional
provisons, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-78
Term--Local Government Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 843, 845-50 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
1977-78 Term].
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Banking Department v. Acadiana Bank and Trust Co. 5 invalidated a
provision in a 1976 Act that had prohibited banks in nine named
parishes from opening on Saturdays. 6 The per curiam opinion ruled
that the challenged provision violated article III, section 12(6) of the
1974 constitution, which prohibits the legislature from enacting local
laws regulating trade. The court's brief opinion adds little gloss to
the definition of what constitutes a local law except to cite State v.
LaBauve 7 and to emphasize that the vice in the banking legislation
stemmed from the "specific designation" of the parishes to which
the provision applied. 8 Despite its limited doctrinal importance, Acadiana Bank is significant because it confirms that the court is giving
close scrutiny to laws applicable to a single locality or a small group
of localities-especially when the localities are specified by name
rather than by the characteristics of a class to which they belong.
State v. Slay'" is a second opinion reflecting the new scrutiny
that the court is displaying with respect to local laws. In Slay the
court reversed a conviction for violating the criminal provisions of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 56:322,"° which regulates the use of mesh
15. 360 So. 2d 846 (La. 1978). In a footnote, the court also stated that "[tihe trial
court correctly held that the defendent bank was denied the equal protection of the
law"; but it professed "not [to] reach this issue." Id at 847 n.2 (emphasis added).
Justice Summers dissented without opinion, and Justice Marcus filed a concurring
and dissenting opinion that Chief Justice Sanders joined. Justice Marcus agreed with
the footnote statement that the law denied the bank equal protection of the law, but
he dissented from the holding that the act was a local or special law. 360 So. 2d at 847
(Marcus, J., concurring & dissenting in part). He would apparently limit the reach of
the constitutional provisions on local and special laws to encompass only laws that are
"directed to secure some private advantage or advancement for the benefit of private
persons or private property within a certain locality." Id. at 848. He did not explain
why the bank law would not fall within that definition. At first glance it would seem to
satisfy the test since its purpose appears to protect private banks that wanted to close
on Saturday from the competition of other banks that wanted to remain open.
16. 1976 La. Acts, No. 98, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 1:55(D) (Supp. 1973).
17. 359 So. 2d 181 (La. 1978). For an analysis of LaBauve, see 1977-1978 Term,
supra note 14, at 847-50.
18. 360 So. 2d at 847.
19. 370 So. 2d at 508 (La. 1979).
20. The trial court convicted Slay on two different charges: using nets of an illegal
size in violation of Revised Statutes 56:322(D) and using nets that.had not been tagged
by the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries as required by Revised Statutes
56:322(A)(5). Although the court's opinion addresses only the validity of subsecton D, it
concludes with the assertion that "the statute R.S. 56:322 must therefore be considered a local law which violates Article 3, § 12 of the Lousiana Constitution." 370 So.
2d at 511. The court made no attempt to explain why the invalidity of subsecton D,
which is an exception to the general rule of subsection A, also invalidated subsection
A, which draws different geographical designations than subsection D; nor did it explain why the invalidity of subsection D also nullified the conviction under subsection
A(5), which applied to all gill nets used in the state "except approved devices for taking
of bait."
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nets in the fresh water areas of the state. "In brief, the statute prohibit[ed] the use of nets with mesh less than two inches square or
four inches stretched except in [specifically designated areas], where
mesh of one inch square or two inches stretched is permitted."'" The
court held that the statute violated the constitutional ban against
enacting local or special laws defining any crime22 because the legislature lacked any rational basis for distinguishing the areas in which
smaller nets were permitted from those in which larger nets were
required.
The court's analysis of the statute challenged in Slay began with
the premise that a "statute is suspect as a local or special law if its
operation is limited to certain parishes or designated areas unless
the limitation results from a reasonable classification such as population or physical characteristics."2 The statute contained no explanation for the classifications it established, but the Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries tried to defend the statutory scheme in an
amicus brief; it contended "that the smaller mesh is permitted [in
certain areas] to promote efficient management of fishery resources
in southern areas of the state where the great confluence of waters
gives rise to a large fish population." 2' The court rejected this rationale because it did not have factual support. Relying on "a standard map of the state" and "expert testimony adduced at trial," the
court concluded that the statutory scheme was not consistent with
the purpose that the Department claimed it served, especially "since
large expanses of waters in the southern part of the state are not included in the areas [where smaller mesh is allowed]."25
Although Slay largely relies on LaBauve, it goes beyond the
earlier decision in one important respect. It demonstrates that the
mere assertion of a rationale for choosing the particular localities
will not suffice; one must be able to offer evidence showing that the
21. 370 So. 2d at 510-11.
22. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12(10).
23. 370 So. 2d at 511.
24. Id
25. I& The court used the following examples to explain why it rejected the
Department's rationale:
It is difficult to believe that the fish population is significantly greater in St. Mary
Parish, where the one inch mesh is permitted, than in Vermilion Parish or the
western part of Iberia Parish, where using the smaller mesh entails criminal
liability. It also appears anomalous that fishermen may use the one inch mesh in
the Ouachita River within the boundaries of Caldwell Parish, but must fish with
the larger mesh once the river flows into Catahoula Parish. Certainly it strains
logic to assume that the fish population is significantly smaller in the downriver
parish, especially in light of the expert testimony adduced at trial that most fish
in the state spawn in the southern waters and migrate to the north.
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rationale is one that offers a reasonable basis for the statutory
scheme.2" Taken in conjunction with Acadiana Bank, it reiterates the
LaBauve message that the Louisiana Supreme Court is increasingly
unwilling to uphold, as general laws, statutes that limit their applicability to a few specifically named localities.
Unfortunately, recent statutes suggest that LaBauve's warning,
now reinforced by Acadiana Bank and Slay, has had little impact on
the legislative process in the state. Durings its last two sessions, the
Louisiana legislature has passed a number of acts that limit their applicability to particular localities. Some were advertised as article
III, section 13 requires for all local bills.27 Others, however, contain
no notice of publication even though they specify the localities to
which they apply,28 and no apparent pattern distinguishes those that
are advertised from those that are not. Moreover, advertising does
not render a local law valid if it concerns a subject on which local
laws are prohibited. At least one recent law seems to violate the
ban in article III, section 12 against local laws defining a crime," and
other statutes might arguably be construed as falling within the list
of prohibited subjects. For example, does a law changing the debt
limit of school districts "regulat[e] the raising of money for the
management, building, or repairing of parish or city schools" in
violation of section 12(A)(8)? 0 Finally, even in those cases in which
the legislature has legislated by classification rather than enumeration of the localities to which the act applies, it has often drawn the
classes so narrowly that they can apply only to a single locality.2 In26. Id. The inquiry into the reasonableness of the classification when the
legislature has designated the areas by name rather than by designating the class to
which the area belongs suggests that the court will continue to allow legislation for
specifically named localities when the legislature has a reasonable basis for its choice.
See Davenport v. Hardy, 349 So. 2d 858 (La. 1977); 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14, at
847-50. The 1979 revision to the section invalidated in Slay appears to satisfy that test
since it distinguishes between freshwater and saltwater areas in establishing the types
of nets that are permissible. 1979 La. Acts, No. 226, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 56:322
(Supp. 1978).
27. E.g., 1979 La. Acts, No. 162 (authorizing an additional sales tax for Rapides
Parish); 1979 La. Acts, No. 55 (authorizing the city of New Orleans to issue bonds for
Audubon Park).
28. E.g., 1979 La. Acts, No. 375 (increasing the debt limits of the school districts
in the parishes of DeSoto, Red River, and Sabine); 1978 La. Acts, No. 45 (establishing
rules for disposing of license fees and taxes collected in Calcasieu Parish).
29. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 432 (authorizing permanent registration for homestead
exemption in specified parishes and making it a misdemeanor in those parishes for
anyone to fail "to notify the assessor in writing that the property on which he has
claimed a homestead exemption under this Section no longer qualifies for that exemption").
30. See, e.g., 1979 La. Acts, Nos. 234 & 375.
31. See, e.g., 1979 La. Acts, No. 214 (applicable to municipalities "with a population in excess of five hundred thousand persons on the effective date of this Act," a
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sofar as these classifications are overly restrictive, they may be
treated as local laws under the test established by LaBauve.
UTILITY SERVICES

The energy crisis of recent years has had a severe impact on
Louisiana local governments whose utility departments provide electrical service.2 In the past, many of them have used natural gas to
generate their electricity, and the skyrocketing cost of natural gas
has resulted in a rapid rise in the cost of electricity. In addition,
shortages of natural gas during periods of peak usage in the last
several years have exacerbated the cost pressure by requiring local
governments to substitute other fuels, which are less efficient and
even more expensive. The cumulative effect of these pressures has
forced local governments to search for new ways to contain utility
costs. Recent decisions of the Louisiana appellate courts have
reflected sensitivity to this effort by giving an extremely sympathetic reading to state statutes authorizing two methods for
municipalities to handle the rising cost of generating electricity-combined action by groups of local governments and the
substitution of a private franchisee for the local government, but
these decisions also demonstrate the continuing need for a comprehensive revision of the statutes governing utilities owned by
local governments.
Joint Action by Local Governments
One possible alternative for local governments to contain rising
utility costs is to build new generating facilities that operate more
efficiently by utilizing the latest technology. Under the 1974 constitution, the legislature can authorize the state's political subdivisions" to issue bonds to construct revenue-producing public
class that includes only New Orleans); 1979 La. Acts, No. 509 (applicable to parishes
"with a population of not less than 50,000 and not more than 52,000 persons
according
to the 1970 Federal Decennial Census," a class that includes only St. Bernard Parish);
1978 La. Acts, No. 297 (limited to East Baton Rouge Parish by making it applicable to
"any parish having a population, according to the latest official federal
decennial census, of not less than 250,000 or more than 325,000 in which there presently exists a
single gas utility district").
32. The Revised Statutes authorize parishes and municipalities to own and
operate "revenue producing public utilities," the broad definition of which includes
electrical service. See generally LA. R.S. 33:4161-69 (1950); see also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Local Government Law, 38 LA.
L. REV. 462, 463-64 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1976-1977 Term].
33. The constitutional definition of "political subdivision" includes parishes,
municipalities, and any other units of local government "authorized by law to perform
governmental functions." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(2).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40

utilities," and the legislature has implemented this provision in
chapter 10 of title 33 of the Revised Statutes. 5 Both the constitutional provision and the statute limit the security of the bonds to
the assets and income of the utility 8 and the constitution specifically
precludes them from constituting "a charge upon the other income
and revenues of the political subdivision." 7
Economies of scale often make combined action by various local
governments desirable. 8 In recognition of this fact, the constitution
allows local governments to perform "any authorized power or function, including financing, jointly or in cooperation with one or more
political subdivisions, either within or without the state";" and the
legislature has passed Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:1321-37, the
"Local Services Law,"'" one of the purposes of which is to allow
political subdivisions" to make agreements for the joint "construcincluding but not betion ... of public projects or improvements ....
electric systems."' 2 To facilitate the development
ing limited to ....
of these agreements among local governments, the Local Services
Law permits local governing bodies that conclude an agreement to
create "a joint commission as an agency and instrumentality of such
[political subdivisions] to administer the terms of such agreement";'"
and a 1975 addition to the law, Louisiana Revised Statutes
33:1334(D, declares every such joint commission "to be a body
politic and political subdivision of the state . . . with all rights,
powers, and authority granted to political subdivisions of the state
under the constitution and general laws of the state."" Moreover,
34. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 37.
35. LA. R.S. 33:4221-62 (1950), as amended by 1956 La. Acts, No. 17, § 1; 1962 La.
Acts, No. 224, § 1; 1968 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. 33, § 1; 1970 La. Acts, No. 558, §§ 1-2;
1972 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. 12, § 1; 1976 La. Acts, No. 461, § 1; 1976 La. Acts, No.
505, § 1.
36. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 37(A); LA. R.S. 33:4221 (1950), 33:4252 (Supp. 1972).
37. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 37(A).
38. See Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863, 865 (La. 1978).
39. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (emphasis added).
40. LA. R.S. 33:1321-37 (1950), as amended by 1954 La. Acts, No. 665, §§ 1-4; 1956
La. Acts, No. 443, § 1; 1972 La. Acts, No. 9, § 1; 1973 La. Acts, No. 103, § 1; 1974 La.
Acts, No. 463, § 1; 1975 La. Acts, No. 597, § 1; 1976 Acts, No. 451, § 1; 1976 La. Acts,
No. 577, § 1; 1978 La. Acts, No. 244, § 1.
41. The statutory grant of authority extends to "[a]ny parish, municipality or
political subdivision of the state, or any combination thereof." LA. R.S. 33:1324 (Supp.
1978). Moreover, the statute defines "municipality" to "include cities, towns, villages,
or other special districts or other political subdivisions created to perform one or more
public functions or services." LA. R.S. 33:1321 (Supp. 1954).
42. LA. R.S. 33:1324 (Supp. 1978).
43. Id.
44. LA. R.S. 33:1334(D) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 577, § 1.
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subsection A of section 1334 specifically permits the parties to an
agreement to authorize a joint commission "to issue in its corporate
name, any revenue bonds of such commission to finance the cost of
the construction . . . of such public projects or improvements." 5 It
further provides that the joint commission bonds may be the joint
and several obligation of the parties to the agreement, but
stipulates that the bonds shall be payable "solely from the revenues
derived from the operation of the public project constructed or acquired with the proceeds of such revenue bonds."'" Subsection C
reiterates that the political subdivisions that create the joint commission are not liable for payment of the principal or interest of the
joint commission's bonds
except as provided in Subsection A of this Section and, in addition, the [political subdivisions] may contract for services furnished by any joint facility constructed by the commission and
the [political subdivisions] may obligate themselves to make
payments for such term, not exceeding forty years, and in such
manner as may be provided in such contract.' 7
Finally, the 1975 amendment added Louisiana Revised Statutes
33:1337, which directs the liberal construction of the provisions
governing joint financing "to the end that, through the use of arrangements and agreements provided for herein between one or
more [local governments] and/or joint commissions . . . greater
economy and efficiency in the providing of electrical and energy services to the citizens may be achieved."'"
As authorized by the Local Services Law, four Louisiana cities'"
agreed to construct a new electric generating plant jointly, and they
created a joint commission, the Louisiana Municipal Power Commission (LAMPCO), to administer the agreement and to build the proposed $90,000,000 plant. Once the plant is constructed, "each city
will be entitled to purchase a percentage of the project's capability
45. LA. R.S. 33:1334(A) (Supp. 1976).
46. Id.
47. LA. R.S. 33:1334(C) (Supp. 1976).
48. LA. R.S. 33:1337, added by 1975 La. Acts, No. 597. This direction appears
redundant in view of section 1323, which provides that all of part VII of chapter 2 of title 33 of the Revised Statutes "shall be construed liberally, to the end that, through
the use of the arrangements provided herein, greater economy and efficiency in the
operation of local services may be encouraged, and the benefits of such services may
be extended." LA. R.S. 33:1323 (1950).
49. The four cities were Morgan City, Franklin, Opelousas, and Natchitoches.
Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863, 864 (La. 1978). According to the
decision of the court of appeal, the city of Thibodeaux had originally planned to participate in the LAMPCO project but later withdrew. 355 So. 2d 578, 579 n.2 (La. App.
3d Cir.), rev'd, 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978).
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. . . and also will be compelled to do so under a 'take or pay' contract, although it is contemplated that unneeded capacity will be
sold to outsiders or adjusted between the cities." 0 Each city's contract calls for it to pay a proportionate share of LAMPCO's "monthly
power costs" (which include items such as maintenance, renewal,
or replacement of the facility; all costs of production; and any uninsured liability for damages) plus a ten percent surcharge. These
payments are payable as an operating expense of each city's existing municipal utility system, and the cities are obligated to make
their payment regardless of whether the LAMPCO project is completed or they receive the anticipated power and energy from

LAMPCO.
To finance the plant, LAMPCO proposed to issue $90,000,000 in
revenue bonds, and it initiated an action to obtain judicial validation
of the bonds and the power contracts of the various cities. Opponents of the proposal lodged two principal objections to the
LAMPCO scheme-that the bonds and power sales contracts were
not authorized by the statute and that the power sales contracts and
bonds violated the constitutional provision prohibiting bonds issued
in connection with revenue-producing public utilities from being
charged against the "other income and revenues" of a local political
subdivision. In Board of Commissioners v. All Taypayers,5" the Loui50. 360 So. 2d at 866.
51. 360 So. 2d 863 (La. 1978), rev'g 355 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 3d Cir.). Justice Marcus was the sole dissenter. He accepted both arguments advanced by the opponents:
that the statutes did not authorize the bonds and power sales contracts and that the
bonds violated the constitutional prohibition precluding bonds from constituting a
charge against the "other income and revenues" of a political subdivision. 360 So. 2d at
872 (Marcus, J., dissenting). In arguing that the bonds and power sales contracts were
not authorized by the statute, he found that the failure to condition the cities' obligations under the power sales contracts on the receipt of electrical service made the
bonds violate the requirement of section 1334(A) that they be "payable ... solely from
the revenues derived from the operation of the public project." To the contrary, he
argued, they were "payable from the combined municipal utility system of each
member city" and thus were not "authorized by La. R.S. 33:1334(A)." Id. This analysis
of the language of section 1334(A) is impeccable, but the argument of the dissent is
ultimately unpersuasive because it ignores subsection C of that same section, which
recognizes "contracts for services" as an additional form of security for the bonds. See
text at notes 61-62, infra.
Equally unconvincing is the dissent's argument that the bonds violate the constitutional provision prohibiting the bonds from constituting a charge against the "other income and revenues" of the political subdivision because the power sales contracts
make the bonds payable from the combined utility revenues of the cities. In the first
place, the dissent's analysis suffers from the same imprecision as the majority opinion
because it fails to identify the applicable political subdivision to which it applies. See
text at notes 62-64, infra. Moreover, assuming LAMPCO is the political subdivision to
which the provision applies, the dissent fails to give any explanation of its rejection of
the majority's view that the funds that LAMPCO will derive from the power sales contracts are revenues from the LAMPCO project. See text at note 52, infra.
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siana Supreme Court rejected both arguments and gave LAMPCO
the declaration of validity that it sought.
With respect to the contention that the bonds and contracts
were not authorized by the statute, the key issue was whether
funds derived from the power sales contracts of the cities were
revenues derived from the operation of the proposed LAMPCO project. Since the contracts were enforceable against all of the utility
revenues of the cities, the opponents contended that the effect of
the arrangement was to make the bonds payable out of the combined
utility revenues of the various cities and that the bonds were not,
therefore, payable solely out of revenues from the LAMPCO project.
Relying on the statutory direction to construe the statutory provisions liberally to promote "greater efficiency in the providing of
electric and energy services," the supreme court rejected that argument and concluded that the phrase "revenues derived from the
operation of the public project" included "all LAMPCO revenues, including those derived from the power sales contracts." 2 The court
also held that the statute authorized the power sales contracts
because they were contracts for services as that term was used in
section 1334(C), even though they obligated the cities to make
payments "irrespective of completion of the project or ultimate
delivery of project power."" Relying again on section 1337's rule of
liberal construction as well as "the purposes of the statute," the
court declared "that the contract for service contemplated by R.S.
33:1334(C) includes one under the terms of which LAMPCO, the
agent/instrumentality of the four member cities, obliges itself to construct a $90,000,000 plant and, assuming successful completion
thereof, to furnish electric power in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. 54
Finally, the supreme court ruled that the power sales contracts
and the proposed bonds did not violate the constitutional provision
precluding bonds issued in connection with revenue-producing
utilities from constituting "a charge upon the other income and
52. 360 So. 2d at 867. The majority also relied on the authority granted cities by
section 1337 "to adopt such other ordinances and resolutions, take such other actions
and charge and collect such fees as may be contemplated or necessary by the said Contract, all for the purpose intended," but that reliance appears to have been misplaced.
The "said contract" in that clause refers to an "Energy Resource Contract as authorized
by R.S. 33:1335," LA. R.S. 33:1337 (Supp. 1975); and the energy resource contract is, in
turn, defined as an agreement between a political subdivision or joint commission and
a privately owned utility. LA. R.S. 33:1335 (Supp. 1975). Since LAMPCO had entered
into no such contract with a privately owned utility, this authority conferred by section 1337 is irrelevant.
53. 360 So. 2d at 867.
54. Id. at 867-68.
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revenues of the local political subdivision. ' 55 That prohibition did
not, the court declared, limit the bonds to the income produced from
the specific project; it merely precluded the bonds from being a
charge upon the income and revenues "other than utility revenues"5
of the political subdivision. Even though the power sales contracts
required the city to pay if the project were not completed or the
project power furnished, they made the debts "payable only from
the revenues and receipts of the respective combined municipal utility
systems of the four cities" and did not, therefore, constitute a
charge against "other income and revenues.""
The court recognized that "conceivably customers of the utility
may be exposed to increased charges, in the event the project fares
worse than the feasibility studies suggest," but concluded that this
possibility did not make the bonds payable from the "cities' entire
revenues and assets" when the non-utility income could "in no way
be charged or burdened with payment of the revenue bonds at
issue." Similarly, although the court acknowledged that the possible loss to the cities' general funds of net utility revenues might affect the solvency of the cities, it nonetheless found that this
possibility did not "convert a charge against utility revenues to a
charge against other income and revenues."59 According to the court,
concern for the project's "overall effect upon the cities' general
revenue picture" might well be legitimate, but it was a policy determination that was appropriate for "the governing bodies of the
cities, rather than the courts.""0
The court reached a desirable result in Board of Commissioners
by implementing a statute designed to equip local governments to
handle the energy crisis more effectively, but the court's opinion is
not completely satisfying. Although it properly emphasized the
legislative direction to construe the statute liberally, the opinion
fails to complete the analytical process by demonstrating why the
decision is consistent with the statutory language and purposes.
This omission is unfortunate, because greater attention to the
details supporting the court's decision would have made the opinion
more persuasive.
The initial weakness in the court's opinion is its failure to
analyze separately the two issues involved in its determination that
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

LA. CONST. art. VI, § 37(A). See notes 33-37, supra, and accompanying text.
360 So. 2d at 868 (emphasis in original).

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

1980]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979

693

the statute authorized the bonds and contracts -whether the bonds
were to be paid solely from the revenues of the public project and
whether the cities had authority to enter into their contracts with
LAMPCO. As a result of this analytical imprecision, the court failed
to focus on the statutory language. In particular, the court failed to
discuss the critical language of Louisiana Revised Statutes
33:1334(C), although it did cite the subsection."' As noted above, that
subsection established two exceptions to the general rule that local
governments are not liable for the revenue bonds of a joint commission: (1) "as provided in Subsection A," the local governments may
be joint obligors on bonds payable solely from the revenues derived
from the operation of the public project; and, (2) "in addition," the
local governments may "contract for services" furnished by a joint
facility for periods up to forty years. The location of the contractual
authority in section 1334(C) seems significant. Placing the provision
concerning contractual authority as an exception to the general rule
that local goverments are not liable for the bonds supports the inference that the legislature intended not only to grant local governments authority to contract with a joint commission, but to allow a
local government's obligation under such a contract to serve as
security for the bond as well. This inference, in turn, supports the
court's conclusion that the legislature meant the funds produced
from those obligations to be part of the revenues of the public utility
out of which the bonds are payable.
This conclusion does not, of course, completely settle the question of whether the LAMPCO bonds could be secured by LAMPCO's
power sales contracts with its member cities. Under the provisions
of section 1334(C), the obligations incurred by the cities can secure
the bonds only if the contracts were "contracts for services" within
the meaning of the subsection. But since the providing of electricity
was the "service" for which LAMPCO was created and the contracts
called for LAMPCO to deliver electricity to the cities, the LAMPCO
contracts would appear to be precisely the type of contract that section 1334 envisioned. Nor should the decision of the cities to obligate
themselves even if LAMPCO failed to deliver electricity change this
conclusion. Although this decision might be imprudent, it would not
change the nature of the contract; the contract would still be one requiring LAMPCO to provide electrical services. Moreover, the
statutory language contains no hint of any legislative intention to
prescribe a limit on the type of obligation that a local government
could assume under section 1334(C).62
61. Id. at 867. See also id. at 865.
62. Had the legislature merely intended to authorize contracts to purchase power,
the more logical place to locate the authorization would have been Revised Statutes
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Careful analysis of the statutory language thus supports the
court's conclusion that the statute authorizes the LAMPCO bonds
and the contracts that secure them, but one issue still remains-whether the bonds violated the constitutional prohibition
precluding the bonds of a revenue-producing public utility from constituting a charge against the "other income and revenues" of the
political subdivision that issues the bonds. Here again, the court's
opinion is not as precise as one would like. The court correctly notes
that the constitutional provision does not limit the security for
bonds to a specific project, but allows the pledging of all utility
revenues of the political subdivision as security. While that decision
may be unwise, it is appropriately one for the legislative body of the
local government.
The court fails, however, to explain how this provision applies to
the LAMPCO bonds. Specifically, the court neglects to identify the
"political subdivision" to which the provision applies. If LAMPCO is
that subdivision because it issued the bonds, the inapplicability of
the section is obvious because the court had previously determined
that all of its income (including the funds derived from the power
sales contracts) were revenues of the public project. The more difficult question is whether the cities that created LAMPCO are also
subdivisions that have issued bonds within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The proper answer to this question should be
that they are. Although the cities apparently failed to take advantage of the statutory authorization"3 to serve as joint obligors on the
bonds," they achieved the same practical result by allowing LAMPCO
to use the power sales contracts as security for the bonds and by
also making each city's obligations under its contract enforceable
against its total utility revenues. Thus, exempting them from the
coverage of the constitutional prohibition would enable them to
evade the constitution's requirements by indirection.
But even if the constitutional provision covers local governments that issue bonds through a joint commission, the LAMPCO
bonds should not be held to violate the substantive prohibition of
the provision because the provision allows the pledging of all utility
revenues of the political subdivision as security. Insofar as the
member cities are covered by the provisions as bond-issuing political
subdivisions, they may pledge all of their utility revenues to support
33:4164, which is entitled "Contracts for obtaining water or electricity from another
political subdivision or private person."
63. LA. R.S. 33:1334(A) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 577, § 1.
64. The supreme court opinion is silent as to whether the cities directly pledged
their utility income to support the bonds, but the opinion of the court of appeal indicates that they did not. 355 So. 2d at 579.
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the project, and that type of pledge is what the member cities of
LAMPCO have offered. Not only does this interpretation satisfy the
literal wording of the constitution, it is also consistent with the
separate constitutional permission for local governments to perform
financing functions with other political subdivisions"5 because it
grants LAMPCO's member cities the same authority, and imposes
on them the same limits, as any one of them would have had if it
had built the plant individually."
In sum, the court intuitively reached the right result in Board of
Commissioners. Unfortunately, by its incomplete explanation of the
rationale behind the result, the court missed an excellent opportunity
to demonstrate and endorse an analytically precise approach to a
complicated and ambiguous problem of statutory construction.
Substitution of a Private Franchisee
The Revised Statutes permit a local government to sell its utility
properties, "including all proper franchises to operate the same not
to exceed sixty years," if a majority of the electors voting in an election held for that purpose approve the action. 7 If the election vote is
favorable, the local government's governing authority must pass an
ordinance directing "the appropriate executive officer to make the
sale, lease or other contract, submitted to the voters, including the
franchise to operate the same, and to execute the deeds, conveyances, and contracts necessary to carry out and consummate the
proposition submitted and voted on." 8
One major obstacle in persuading a private company to accept a
franchise to operate government-owned utilities is the franchisee's
reluctance to have the local government set the rates for the utility
when it is privately operated. Louisiana local governments have
traditionally set the rates for the utilities they owned," and the
65. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 20. Curiously, the court's opinion ignores this provision
entirely.
66. See LA. R.S. 33:4221 (1950) (political subdivision issuing bonds for improving a
revenue-producing public utility may issue bonds secured by "pledge of the income and
revenues of the public utility").
67. LA. R.S. 33:4341 (Supp. 1972). The statutory authorization extends to all
municipalities except New Orleans, parishes, and other political subdivisions or taxing
districts. LA. R.S. 33:4341 (Supp. 1972).
68. LA. R.S. 33:4346 (Supp. 1972).
69. Prior to the passage of the 1974 constitution, the Revised Statutes authorized
local governments to "establish rates, rules, and regulations with respect to the sale
and distribution" of the commodity or service furnished by a governmentally-owned
utility. LA. R.S. 33:4163 (1950). Under the 1921 constitution, local governments retained
"the powers of supervision, regulation and control over any street railway, gas, electric light, heat, power, waterworks, or other local public utility" that were vested in
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Revised Statutes expressly grant local governments authority to set
the "fees and charges" for utilities that have been financed with
revenue bonds. The same section that grants that authority also provides that "[n]o board or commission other than the governing body
of the [local government] shall have authority to fix or supervise the
making of these fees and charges."7
For those public utilities owned by local governments as of the
effective date of the 1974 constitution, the new constitution continues the local government's traditional authority to set utility
rates. Although the constitution grants the Public Service Commission general regulatory authority over public utilities,71 it denies the
Commission power over any public utility owned or operated by a
local government on the date that the constitution became effective
"except by the approval of a majority of the electors voting in an
election held for that purpose."72 Moreover, even if a local government chooses to allow the Commission to regulate its public utility,
the constitution permits the local government to "reinvest itself
with such regulatory power in the manner in which it was surrendered."73
The Revised Statutes contain two sets of procedures that a local
government may follow when it desires to transfer regulatory
jurisdiction over its public utility to the Public Service Commission.
One is Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4491-96, which was enacted in
the special legislative session following the adoption of the provision
of the 1921 constitution that first allowed local governments to
transfer regulatory authority to the Public Service Commission.4
These sections permit a local government to call an election on the
question of the surrender of regulatory jurisdiction either when the
local government's governing body adopts an ordinance calling for
the local governments at the time of the adoption of that constitution. LA. CONST. of
1921, art. VI, § 7; cf. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21 (analogous provision of 1974 constitution).
This reservation of power meant that those local governing bodies which had been
given authority to grant private franchises and to fix rates for local public utilities
prior to the adoption of the 1921 constitution could continue to exercise those
prerogatives, but other local governments had no such authority. State v. City of New
Orleans, 151 La. 24, 91 So. 533 (1922). Compare City of Shreveport v. Southwestern
Gas & Elec. Co., 151 La. 864, 92 So. 365 (1922) (Shreveport had no power to impose
compulsory gas rates), with Baton Rouge Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 156 La. 539, 100 So. 710 (1924) (Baton Rouge was vested with implied power
to make rates to govern the water supplied by the waterworks company).
70. LA. R.S. 33:4256 (1950).
71. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(B).
72. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(C).
73. Id
74. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VI, § 7. See note 69, supra.
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an election or when ten percent of the local government's qualified
electors sign a petition requesting an election. 5 Following the adoption of the ordinance or the presentation of the petition, the governing body must call the election." If a majority of the votes cast favor
surrender of regulatory jurisdiction, "the Louisiana Public Service
Commission shall have the supervision and control of the public
utility,"" and authority continues until the local government
reinvests control in itself "by holding an election in the same manner and with all of the same formalities hereinabove provided." 6
In 1975 the legislature amended title 45 of the Revised Statutes,
which governs the Public Service Commission, to establish another
set of procedures for transferring regulatory jurisdiction to the
Commission." "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary," section 1164.2 requires a local government's governing body to call a
"referendum election . ..to determine whether or not any public
utility owned by [the local government] shall be under the jurisdiction and control of the commission" when it is presented with a petition signed by "not less that twenty-five percent of or seven thousand five hundred of the qualified electors residing within [the boundaries of the local government], whichever is less.""0 The sections
that follow established detailed rules concerning the petition and
election," and section 1164.13 requires the local government to promulgate the election results by adopting a resolution or ordinance at
its first regular meeting following the election. 2 In addition, section
1164 provides that the statutory provision defining the Public Ser75. LA. R.S. 33:4491 (1950).
76. The proposition to be voted on in this election is to be submitted in the following form:
(Name of town, city or parish) surrender its
Proposition No. 1. Shall___
(Name of the public
powers of supervision, regulation and control over-__
utility service, such as, street railway, gas, electric light, power, heat, water
works, or other local public utility.)
LA. R.S. 33:4493 (1950).
77. LA. R.S. 33:4494 (1950). To effect this transfer, the governing body of the local
government calling the election must enter the results of the elections in its minutes,
and its clerk must send certified copies of this order to the Public Service Commission.
"Immediately" upon filing of this document with the commissioner, control over the
utility vests in the Commission. LA. R.S. 33:4494 (1950).
78. LA. R.S. 33:4495 (1950).
79. 1975 La. Acts, No. 328, § 2, adding LA. R.S. 45:1164.1 to .13.
80. LA. R.S. 45:1164.2 (Supp. 1975).
81. LA. R.S. 45:1164.3 to .12 (Supp. 1975). The proposition to be voted on is supposed to be submitted in the following form:
(public utility) owned
Shall the Public Service Commission regulate the
.
No
by
(the political subdivision)? Yes_
LA. R.S. 33:1164.7 (Supp. 1975).
82. LA. R.S. 45:1164.13 (Supp. 1975).
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vice Commission's power to regulate rates and services" do not apply
"to any public utility, the title to which is in . . . [a local
government], unless the electors of such [local government], and
such other electors as are customers of the public utility, have
manifested their approval of being under the jurisdiction of the
public service commission" as required by the constitution "in the
manner provided by R.S. 45:1164.1-45:1164.13. ''84
When a 1976 engineering study recommended that the city of
Monroe sell its electric system to Louisiana Power and Light Company, the city entered into negotations with the company that led to
a proposed operating agreement whereby the company would take
over operation of the city's electric utility system.85 The proposed
agreement granted the company a sixty-year franchise to operate
the utility with an option to purchase it when currently outstanding
bonds are paid.88 The agreement called for the company to assume
all operating liabilities and responsibilities of the system and to pay
the city two percent of the system's monthly revenues.87 It also forbade the city from granting a competitive franchise, from selling additional electric revenue bonds, or from selling or mortgaging the
electric system. In addition, the city agreed to surrender ratemaking control to the Public Service Commission and promised not
to seek to have the authority reinvested in the city so long as the
operating franchise remained in effect. The agreement further provided that rates to be charged utility customers were those currently
pending final approval from the Public Service Commission with
future rates to be regulated by the Commission. Finally, it permitted, but did not require, the issuance of refunding bonds for the
system.
To attain the necessary popular approval to enter into the proposed
83. Those provisions are Revised Statutes 45:1163, which provides the statutory
grant of power for the Public Service Commission to regulate rates and service, and
Revised Statutes 45:1164, which defines the extent of that power as to service.
84. LA. R.S. 45:1164 (Supp. 1975).
85. Perry v. City of Monroe, 360 So. 2d 1352, 1356 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert denied,
362 So. 2d 583 (La. 1978).
86. The likely reason for delaying the ultimate sale and using a franchise agreement for the immediate future was to provide flexibility for the refinancing of the
bonded indebtedness of the Monroe Utilities Commission. That indebtedness included
bonds issued for improvements both to the electrical system, which was eventually to
be conveyed to Louisiana Power and Light, and the water system, which was to remain under the control of the city. Id. at 1355-56. Proposition 3 authorized the commission to separate the debts attributable to each system when it issued refunding bonds.
Id. at 1357 n.4. See note 91, infra.
87. 360 So. 2d at 1356. It also guaranteed the city a minimum annual payment of

$700,000.
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agreement, the city submitted four propositions to its voters at a
special election called for July 9, 1977.
* Proposition 188 sought voter approval for the proposed
operating agreement, including the company's right to acquire
the system when the bonds are paid.
* 9 Propositions 289 and 490 sought voter approval for the
transfer of rate making jurisdiction to the Public Service Commission; Proposition 2 followed the format prescribed by title 33,
while Proposition 4 followed the format required by title 45.
0 0 0 Propositions 391 sought voter approval for the issuance of
refunding bonds for the entire utility system of the city.
88. The proposition read as follows:
Proposition No. 1. Shall the City of Monroe, State of Louisiana (the "City"), accept
the proposal and offer of Louisiana Power & Light Company (the "Company") to
operate the City's electric power and light plant and system (the "Electric
System"), separately from and independently of the City's waterworks plant and
system, and pursuant to which the City will grant to the Company a 60-year franchise to operate the Electric System and the right and option to acquire the Electric System for the considerations resulting from the terms of the agreement
thereby proposed to be entered into, all in accordance with a written and signed
proposal dated April 26, 1977, on file and available for inspection in the office of
the Secretary-Treasurer of the City in the City Hall?
Id. at 1356 n.1.
89. The second proposition read as follows:
Proposition No. 2. Shall the City of Monroe, State of Louisiana (the "City"), surrender its powers of supervision, regulation and control over all electric utilities,
electric utility service and electric rates in the City, commencing at such time as
Louisiana Power & Light Company's presently pending rate proceeding before
the Louisiana Public Service Commission shall have been finally determined, but
not before said Company shall have begun to operate the City's electric power
and light plant and system and to be effective so long as any electric franchise
from the City to said Company remains in effect?
Id. at 1356-57 n.2. See note 76, supra.
90. The fourth proposition read as follows:
Proposition No. 4. Shall the Louisiana Public Service Commission (the "Commission") regulate the electric power and light plant and system (the "Electric
System") owned by the City of Monroe, Louisiana (the "City"), commencing at
such time as Louisiana Power & Light Company's presently pending rate proceeding before the Commission shall have been finally determined, but not before
said Company shall have begun to operate the City's Electric System and to be effective so long as any electric franchise from the City to said Company remains in
effect?
360 So. 2d at 1357 n.3. See note 81, supra.
91. Propsition 3 read as follows:
Proposition No. 3. Shall the City of Monroe, State of Louisiana (the "City") under
the authority of and pursuant to the provisions of Sub-Part C, Part 1, Chapter 10,
Title 33 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, issue its revenue refunding
bonds to an amount not exceeding $33,133,250, to run not exceeding twenty-seven
(27) years from date thereof, with interest at a rate not exceeding nine per centurn (9%) per annum, for the purpose of refunding and unifying its outstanding
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All four propositions were "overwhelmingly approved" by the electorate.
Opponents of the sale lodged a number of objections to the proposed sale. Among the contentions they raised were claims that the
city lacked authority to prohibit its governing body from reinvesting
itself with regulatory authority over the public utility; that the state
law and bond covenants required the city to retain its rate-making
authority and prohibited the city from transferring that authority to
the Public Service Commission; and that the election was not adequate to authorize the city to enter into the agreement because it
was not called and conducted in substantial compliance with the title
45 procedures. In Perry v. City of Monroe,"2 the second circuit rejected all of the objections, and the supreme court declined to
review the decision.
The objection to the transfer of rate-making jurisdiction to the
Public Service Commission centered on the city's promise not to
Water and Electric Revenue Refunding Bonds and Water and Electric Revenue
Bonds, Series 1966, Series 1967, and Series 1974, dated February 1, 1965, August
1, 1966, November 1, 1967, and August 1, 1974 (such outstanding bonds being
payable solely from the income and revenues of the City's combined waterworks
plant and system and electric power and light plant and system, and having been
issued pursuant to resolutions adopted on March 1, 1965, as amended on June 21,
1966, December 12, 1967, and July 9, 1974), said revenue refunding bonds to be
payable as to principal and interest solely from the income and revenues to be
derived from the City's waterworks plant and system (the "Waterworks System")
and electric power and light plant and system (the "Electric System") which may
be operated as separate and independent utilities, with the governing body of the
City being authorized to issue such revenue refunding bonds in two series, one
series to refund that portion of the outstanding bonds attributable to the Waterworks System and to be payable solely from the income and revenues to be derived
from the Waterworks System, and the other series to refund that portion of the
outstanding bonds attributable to the Electric System and to be payable solely
from the income and revenues to be derived from the Electric System?
360 So. 2d at 1357 n.4. See note 86, supra. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit
attacking this proposition on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to comply with
the provisions of the Bond Validation Law, LA. R.S. 13:5121-30 (Supp. 1972), as amended
by 1975 La. Acts, No. 230, § 1. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment, but he made
no specification of error on appeal. Consequently, the second circuit declined to consider the appeal on the merits. 360 So. 2d at 1357.
92. 360 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 583 (La. 1978). In
addition to the matters discussed in the text, the court also rejected claims that the
transfer of jurisdiction violated the state statute giving the Monroe Utilities Commission management and rate authority for the city's public utilities, id. at 1359; that the
agreement amounted to a donation of public property to a private corporation, id. at
1360; that the notice of the election was inadequate, id. at 1360-61; and that the proposition submitted did not comply with the title 33 requirements because it did not vest
regulatory jurisdiction in the Commission "immediately" upon filing of the order
declaring the election results with the Commission, id. at 1362-63.
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reinvest regulatory authority in itself so long as the company
operated the franchise granted by the agreement."3 The opponents
argued that the city lacked the power to prohibit "the citizens of
Monroe or their governing body from taking any action, including
the calling of an election, to reinvest the city with regulatory power
over the electric utility,"9' but the second circuit took a more
common-sense approach in interpreting the constitutional and
statutory provisions governing the transfer. Since neither the constitution nor the statute expressly prohibited surrender of
regulatory jurisdiction for a definite period of time, the court ruled
that "[t]he authority to surrender or transfer regulatory power implies that it may be done for a specific reasonable period of time."95
This implication was sufficient to validate the city's action because
it had not contracted away the right to reinvest regulatory authority
"permanently" but had merely done so during the period of the franchise." Nor was the court willing to accept the opponents'
characterization of the city's action as "a bartering away of the
city's police power by contract, contrary to established law." 7 Instead, it termed the agreement as "an exercise of the city's police
power" that was "specifically authorized by the Constitution and by
statute."9
The opponents also contended that the city lacked authority to
transfer regulatory authority to the Public Service Commission and
offered three different rationales to support this contention: the
transfer violated covenants in outstanding bonds; the transfer
violated the statutory provision that no board or commission other
than the local government has authority to set rates for a utility
owned by a local government when the utility has issued revenue
bonds; and the same statutory provision implicitly limited the
authority to transfer rate-making control to the Public Service Commission. The court rejected the first two rationales on the ground
93. The city would no longer have any authority to control the rates after the sale
was completed unless it had such authority to regulate privately owned electric
utilities prior to the adoption of the 1921 constitution. See notes 69-73, supra, and accompanying text.
94. 360 So. 2d at 1358.
95. Id.; cf. Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d
402 (1958) (authority to provide sewage and sanitation implies right to contract for
such services for a "reasonable time").
96. 360 So. 2d at 1358-59. Since the city would probably lack jurisdiction to
regulate the rates after the final sale was completed, the practical impact was to effect
a permanent transfer. See note 93, supra. Of course, after the sale was completed, the
city could re-establish a new municipally-owned utility system; but it was unlikely to
do so in the face of the cost pressures that prompted the original sale.
97. 360 So. 2d. at 1359.
98. Id.
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that the plaintiff lacked standing to litigate the issue. According to
the court, both the bond covenants and the statutory prohibition
against transfer existed for the sole benefit of bondholders of the
utility; and, since no bondholder sued as a plaintiff, the plaintiff in
Perry lacked "standing or interest to assert a cause of action" based
on either the statute" or the bonds. 00
The court did address the merits of the argument that the city
lacked statutory authority to transfer regulatory jurisdiction
because the statutory provision forbidding other boards from setting rates implicitly limited the constitutional and statutory
authorizations to transfer rate-making jurisdiction to the Public Service Commission, but the court ultimately rejected this contention
as well. Acceptance of the opponent's interpretation would, the
court said, "render the constitutional and statutory provisions virtually meaningless" because "[a]ny municipally-owned . . . utility
system would almost certainly have outstanding revenue bonds.''.
Noting that neither the constitution nor the statutory provisions
contained any express limitation or prohibition, the court refused to
imply one; to the contrary, it determined that "[h]ad any such limitation or prohibition been intended, it would have been included
within the constitutional provision and statutes specifically dealing
with the subject."'0 2
The third objection raised by the opponents was that the election was invalid because it was not conducted in substantial compliance with title 45 procedures governing transfers of jurisdiction.
Although the court agreed that the approval given to Proposition 4
did not suffice as substantial compliance with the title 45 procedures, 3 it ruled that the election was nonetheless sufficient to
transfer jurisdiction because the procedures followed in submitting
Proposition 2 substantially complied with the title 33 requirements
for a transfer of regulatory jurisdiction. The court expressly rejected the opponents' argument that, in establishing the title 45 procedures in 1975, the legislature intended to repeal the existing procedures in title 33. It discerned in the 1975 legislation "neither express nor implied langauge indicating an intention to repeal [the title 33 procedures]."'0' Emphasizing that "implied repeals are not
99. Id. at 1359-60.
100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id. at 1361.
102. Id.
103. The election on Proposition No. 4 did not substantially comply with the title
45 procedures because it was not called pursuant to a petition of the electors. I at
1362.
104. Id
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favored and that they will not be resorted to except where the in
consistency is too clear and plain to be reconciled," the court concluded that the title 45 procedures "merely supplement" the title 33
procedures "by providing an additional method by which the
citizenry can petition for an election transferring jurisdiction over a
municipally-owned public utility to the Public Service Commission." ' The title 33 procedures remained, therefore, "in full
force and effect"; and, since the election on Proposition 2 was conducted in substantial compliance with those procedures,"° the election permitted transfer of regulatory jurisdiction to the Commission.
The second circuit's resolution of the first two issues discussed
above was largely unexceptional. The court wisely permitted a local
government that has granted an operating franchise to a private
utility to disavow its ability to reinvest regulatory jurisdiction in
itself for the period of the franchise. Such a disavowal seems essential to induce a private company to accept the franchise because a
local government protected by a long-term franchise agreement
would have little incentive to allow the franchisee to raise rates to
achieve an acceptable rate of return if it could reassume control
over rates. Nor is such a disavowal of the reinvestment option inconsistent with the terms of the applicable constitutional or statutory
provisions since neither contains any express language precluding a
disavowal for a specific period of time. Moreover, the limited
disavowal seems to satisfy the most logical explanation for the
reinvestment option: to make transfers of jurisdiction more attractive to local governments. Since the transfer would not be permanent, the local governments might be more willing to give the Public
Service Commission an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to set
fair rates. Allowing disavowal for a reasonable period seems consistent with this purpose because it gives the private utility and the
Commission the opportunity to make the new arrangement work but
also protects the local government's ability to reassume control if it
does not work. Although a sixty-year franchise period may seem
unreasonable at first glance, it is the franchise period that the
legislature has established as permissible for all local
governments, 7 and the court properly deferred to this legislative
determination of what is a reasonable period for a utility franchise.
The claim that a city with outstanding revenue bonds cannot
transfer regulatory jurisdiction to the Public Service Commission
properly gave the second circuit little difficulty in Perry, but it does
105.

1&

106. Id.
107.

LA. R.S. 33:4341 (Supp. 1972).
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call attention to a significant ambiguity in the statutes governing
utilities owned by local governments. The court's decision concerning the Perry plaintiffs' lack of standing to raise the claims relating
to bond covenants allegedly prohibiting transfer of regulatory
jurisdiction was sound. The sole purpose of bond covenants is to protect the bondholders; and, if no bondholder objected to the proposed
transfer, private citizens should not be allowed to force the city to
honor covenants that the bondholders themselves have chosen not
to enforce. The same argument applies to the statutory provision
precluding any board or commission other than the local government from setting the rates for a utility with revenue bonds. That
provision was apparently designed for the bondholders, and only bondholders should be allowed to complain if it is not followed.
The court gave no explanation of why it reached the merits of
the third rationale for the city's alleged inability to transfer
regulatory jurisdiction -the argument that the statutory prohibition
against any other board setting the rates for a utility which has
issued revenue bonds implicitly limits the constitutional and
statutory authority to transfer jurisdiction. 8 But having considered
the substance of the claim, the court properly rejected it. As the
court noted, the provisions expressly dealing with transfers contain
no limitation for utilities with outstanding revenue bonds, and this
omission supports the inference that the legislature meant to impose
no such limitation. This inference is further strengthened by an examination of the practical consequences that flow from acceptance of
the implied limitation. Since virtually all utilities issue revenue
bonds to construct their facilities, implying the limitation advocated
108. At least three arguments might be suggested to support the position that the
plaintiff had standing to raise this issue: (1) As a taxpayer, see 360 So. 2d at 1358, the
plaintiff might be adversely affected. Since utility revenues had traditionally supported the city's general fund, a decline in these revenues might increase his taxes.
See Donaldson v. Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish, 161 La. 471, 482, 109 So. 34, 38
(1926) (Taxpayers have the right to "resort to judicial authority to restrain their public
servants from transcending their lawful powers, or violating their legal duties in any
unauthorized mode which will increase the burden of taxation or otherwise injuriously
affect the taxpayers or their property."); Cully v. City of New Orleans, 173 So. 2d 46,
49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) ("[Tlhe fact that the taxpayer's interest might be small and
not susceptible of accurate determination is not sufficient to deprive him of his right of
action . . . nor in our opinion is it necessary to a right of action for him to show
anything other than facts from which may be drawn the conclusion that his interests
as a taxpayer or property owner are or may be adversely affected)" (Emphasis
added.) (2) Assuming that the plaintiff was a utility subscriber, his interest in maintaining municipal control over future rate increases might be sufficiently distinct from
the public at large to give him standing. (3) If the challenge to the city's authority is
considered an "election contest," the plaintiff might qualify as a "person in interest" as
that phrase is used in the election code. See LA. R.S. 18:1401 (Supp. 1976).
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by the plaintiffs in Perry would have the effect of making the
transfer provisions "virtually meaningless," a result that the
drafters of the provision are unlikely to have intended. Furthermore, construing the statute to imply a limitation on the local
government's constitutional authority to transfer regulatory
jurisdiction would raise the serious question of whether the
legislature had exceeded the powers given to it.1"9
The most substantial issue raised in Perry was the claim that
the title 45 procedures provide the sole method for transferring
regulatory jurisdiction. The opponents of the sale argued that the
1975 legislation establishing the title 45 procedures implicity repealed
the existing procedures in title 33 and that the Monroe election did
not, therefore, authorize the transfer because it did not substantially
comply with the procedures established in title 45. The second circuit dismissed the claim summarily with a reference to the established
rule that implied repeals are not favored and the conclusory assertion that the title 45 provisions "contain neither express nor implied
language indicating an intention to repeal [the title 33 provisions]. 1 0
Unfortunately, a close examination of the statutory language fails to
support the court's assertion. Section 1164 of title 45, which was
enacted as part of the same 1975 statute establishing the procedures
for transferring regulatory jurisdiction, provides that the statutory
sections defining the regulatory power of the Public Service Commission do not apply to a public utility owned by a local government
unless the appropriate electors have "manifested their approval" of
the transfer of jurisdiction to the Commission as required by the
11
constitution "in the manner provided by [the title 45 procedures]..
This language would appear to reflect an intention to make the title
45 procedures the exclusive means for transferring regulatory
jurisdiction and would consequently have precluded the title 33
route followed by the city of Monroe. At a minimum, the issue
merited more than the curt dismissal that the second circuit offered;
the court should have explained why the quoted language was insufficient to manifest a legislative intent to prescribe the title 45 procedures as the exclusive means for a local government to transfer
regulatory jurisdiction to the Commission.
109. The constitution vests the "legislative power of the state" in the legislature.
LA. CONST. art. III, § 1(A). The constitutional question raised by accepting the argument of the plaintiff in Perry is whether the state's legislative power includes the
power to deny to local governments the authority to transfer regulatory jurisdiction
that the constitution has granted to them.
110. 360 So. 2d at 1362.
111. LA. R.S. 45:1164 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
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In terms of specific result, the second circuit's decision probably
achieves a just result because it allows the city of Monroe to follow
a consultant's recommendation that was overwhelmingly endorsed
by the local electorate. It does so, however, only by inattention to
the details of the statutory language that governs transfers of
regulatory jurisdiction. Moreover, it provides little guidance to
other local governments that desire to follow Monroe's lead. Because
the plaintiffs in Perry did not include a bondholder, the court was able
to avoid the difficult problems of whether bond covenants or state
laws designed to protect bondholders can limit a local government's
ability to transfer regulatory authority. In future litigation, opponents of transfer are likely to raise the issues by the simple expedient of purchasing one or more of the utility's bonds.
The basic problem is, of course, the confusing maze of state
statutes. The refrain is a familiar one: The legislature needs to
undertake a comprehensive review of the statutes covering utilities
owned by local governments and resolve the basic policy issues in a
clear and decisive fashion." 2 Until the legislature completes that
assignment, the role the courts can play is rather limited. By
developing sensitivity to fundamental objectives and precise
analysis of the statutory language, they will generally solve specific
problems in an acceptable manner, but they will be unable to
eliminate the myriad ambiguities that exist throughout the
statutory scheme.
LAND USE PLANNING

The local government article of the 1974 constitution authorizes
local governmental subdivisions"' to adopt zoning regulations "[s]ubject to uniform procedures established by law.""1' A state statute""
confirms this power for municipalities"' and establishes procedures
112. See 1976-1977 Term, supra note 32, at 466-67.
113. Article VI defines the term "local governmental subdivision" to include "any
parish or municipality." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44.
114. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
115. LA. R.S. 33:4721-30 (1950), as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 772, §§ 1-2; 1976
La. Acts, No. 175, § 1; 1977 La. Acts, No. 306, § 1.
116. The statute does not define the term municipality, nor is the term defined for
the chapter of the Revised Statutes in which the statute is found. The most common
definition for the term includes "any incorporated city, town, or village," see LA. CONST.
art. VI, § 443); LA. R.S. 33:101 (1950), but certain portions of title 33 define municipality
to encompass all political subdivisions including parishes and special districts. E.g., LA.
R.S. 33:1321, 4251 (1950 & Supp. 1954).
Assuming that the statute follows the common meaning of municipalities and thus
excludes parishes, no general state statute establishes procedures for parish zoning,
although parishes are given specific authority to create airport zones and special provi-
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for them to follow in enacting and enforcing zoning restrictions.
Both the constitution and the statute are silent, however, with
respect to an issue that has frequently arisen in other areas of the
country: the extent to which the state and its agencies must abide
by local zoning ordinances.' In City of New Orleans v. State,"8 the
sions grant general zoning authority to certain parishes. See generally LA. R.S.
2:381-90 (1950); 33:1236 (Supp. 1978); 33:4877 (Supp 1972); LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, §
29. An unanswered question is whether the constitutional provision requires the state
to adopt procedural legislation before a parish can exercise the zoning authority conferred by the constitution. See Murchison, Recent Environmental Developments Affecting Louisiana Petroleum Operations, 26TH INST. MIN. L.
- (1979).
117. In the absence of explicit statutory provisions directly addressing the problem, most state courts have generally concluded that state agencies do not have to
comply with local zoning ordinances. See generally E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ZONING § 25.15 (3d rev. ed. 1976). Courts have offered at least three distinct
rationales for this result: state sovereignty, the governmental nature of the state function, and statutory construction. Commentators have often criticized these decisions,
especially those that have relied on the first two rationales, on the ground that they
beg the pivotal question of what governmental interest should prevail in a conflict between the zoning authority of one political unit and the statutory authority of another.
See, e.g., Comment, Governmental Immunity from Local Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV.
869 (1971). The approach suggested in the text attempts to address that pivotal question by focusing on the precise authorization on which each political unit relies. Cf.
Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 Ill. 442, 14 N.E.2d 490 (1938) (statutory authorization
for park district to locate parks allows it to ignore a city zoning ordinance forbidding
parks in residential areas). It is also consistent with recent decisions that seek to
discern the legislative intent by balancing the local interest against the proposed state
use. See, e.g., Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972) (general statutory
scheme indicated legislative intent that state university could not be restricted by
local land use regulations). See also City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc., 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976)
(state immunity from zoning ordinance depends on the balance between the public interest in the proposed use and the interests protected by the ordinance).
118. 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978). Justice Marcus filed a dissenting opinon in which
he protested "[m]echanical application of an arbitrary rule in favor of the state
[because] it could lead to inequitable results in some instances." 364 So. 2d at 1023
(Marcus, J., dissenting). To decide "which governmental interest should prevail" in
such conflicts, he advocated a "judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the state's
action." Id. at 1024. In this inquiry, the court should consider a number of factors "including the type of facility or use intended by the state, the existing pattern of land
use in the area, the effect of the activity on adjoining areas, public need for the facility,
alternative locations for the facility, and alternative methods for providing the needed
improvement." Id. Although Justice Marcus conceded that the court "might well conclude in this case that the state's interests should prevail," he dissented because he
was "unwilling to say that such a result should obtain automatically in every instance
of conflict." Id.
The approach of the dissenting opinion would be preferable to that advocated by the
majority because it would consider the issue of conflict on a case-by-case basis.
Nonetheless, it is not an optimum solution to the problem. By focusing on
reasonableness rather than legislative intent, it would diminish the legislature's constitutionally established role as the appropriate decision-maker concerning the alloca-
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Louisiana Supreme Court considered this question and held that
municipal zoning ordinances do not restrict the state's use of its property in performance of a governmental function.
As authorized by the consititution and the state statute, the city
of New Orleans adopted a municipal zoning ordinance, and an area
that the ordinance zoned as "Two-Family Residential" contained
Jackson Barracks, a state correctional facility that had housed a
work release program since 1969. In 1976, the Department of Corrections chose Jackson Barracks as the site for a special medical
unit for mentally disturbed prisoners. Following this action by the
Department, the city filed suit seeking to have the state enjoined
from using Jackson Barracks for the housing or treatment of convicted criminals.
In holding that the city could not force the state to comply with
its zoning ordinance, the supreme court relied on the subsection of
the local government article in the state constitution that provides
"[nlotwithstanding any provision of this Article, the police power of
the state shall never be abridged.""' 9 According to the court, this
subsection "removes any doubt" concerning the effect of the
statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing zoning by
municipalities: "They do not abridge the police power of the
12
The state's power "necessarily remains dominant" with the
State.""
municipal police power "subordinate to that retained by the
State..''. From these premises, the court leaped directly to its basic
conclusion that "municipal zoning ordinances cannot control the
State's use of its property in performing a governmental function,"
although the court emphasized that its decision was consistent "with
the views voiced by the delegates to the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention prior to adopting the provisions discussed herein" and
with the "majority rule throughout the country."' 2
City of New Orleans established a sound rule concerning the
way that the 1974 constitution allocates power between the state
and its local governments. The authorization for local governments
to adopt zoning regulations is a particular illustration of the general
tion of powers and functions between local and state governments. By protecting the
state police power against abridgment and by permitting the legislature to deny
powers to local governments by general law, the constitution appears to give the
legislature the authority to make the allocation so long as the legislature does not
violate other provisions that limit its power. See notes 119-22, infra, and accompanying
text.
119. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(b).
120. 364 So. 2d at 1023.
121. Id.
122. Id
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principle in the local government article that the constitution itself
should enable local governments to handle their affairs without the
need for specific legislative authorization."' 3 But this broad grant of
authority was not intended to immunize local governments from
state control;" 4 the constitution preserved the concept of state
supremacy in the provision preventing abridgment of the state's
police power as well as in the limitation on local government powers
15
in cases when the power was "denied by general law.""
Viewed as a
whole, the local government article supports the supreme court's
p~sition that the state should prevail in a direct state-local conflict
over land use controls. 1"
Notwithstanding the soundness of this underlying rationale, the
court's opinion in City of New Orleans deserves criticism for its implicit assumption that requiring a state agency to comply with a
municipal zoning ordinance would always abridge the state's police
power. In the specific case before the court, the assumption was probably justified because a 1977 Act had specifically authorized the use
of Jackson Barracks as a correctional facility for certain categories
of prisoners.' But the assumption appears far less justified in cases
where state agencies act without specific legislative direction concerning the lands they are to use in carrying out a general statutory
mandate. To require the agencies to adhere to local zoning ordinances in such cases would not infringe on the concept of state
supremacy, although it might lessen the policy-making role of the
state bureaucracy. 18 In fact, the contrary assumption-that state
123. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5 & 7. See generally 1977-1978 Term, supra note 14,
at 850-53.
124. The local government article does contain two sections that limit state power
to affect the structure and organization of home rule governments and to change the
salaries and working conditions of local government employees other than police officers and municipal firefighters. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6 & 14; see Kean, Local Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1975).
125. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5 & 7; see 1977-1978 Term, supra, note 14, at 851-52.
126. Indeed, this analysis suggests that the state should prevail whether one labels
the function it is exercising as governmental or proprietary, since the 1974 constitution
draws no such distinction in defining the respective powers of the state and its local
governments.
127. 1977 La. Acts, No. 700, adding LA. R.S. 15:893.1A(7. Interestingly, the legislation specifically forbade the assignment of mentally disturbed prisoners to Jackson
Barracks; it did, however, expressly authorize a work release program at the barracks.
The city argued that the statute's prohibition against housing or treating mentally
disturbed prisoners at the barracks mooted its suit against the state, but the court
disagreed. It concluded that the action was "still viable" because the city had sought
broadly to "restrain the State from using its property as a correctional unit." 364 So.
2d at 1022.
128. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the 1977 legislation expressly
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agencies should normally have to comply with local zoning ordinances-seems more consistent with the constitution's division of
power and the zoning enabling act. Both the constitution and the
statute recognize that local governments are the units normally
responsible for land use controls, and they should be allowed the requisite authority to fulfill this responsibility except where the
legislature has determined that paramount state objectives should
prevail.
Admittedly, the approach suggested here might prove difficult
to apply in some cases, for it would require careful analysis of different state statutes to ascertain the legislative intent.1" But the
results of that analysis, preserving the respective roles of state and
local governments in setting rational land use policies, should warrant the effort.
TORT LIABILITY

The 1978-79 term did not bring any startling decisions with
respect to the 1974 constitution's waiver of governmental immunity
in tort and contract cases,130 but the state's appellate courts did
decide several cases that deserve brief attention. For one thing, the
year witnessed the final decision on the merits in the lawsuit attempting to impose liability on the town of Boyce for the death of
Merlin Honeycutt, who was killed by the Boyce town marshal. The
trial court originally dismissed the suit on the ground that the town
was not liable for the marshal's actions because he was an independent elected official over whom the town had no control, but the
supreme court reversed that determination. 3 ' After a trial on the
merits following remand, the trial judge ruled "that at the time of
the shooting [the marshal] was not, as a matter of fact, in the process of making an arrest but that he shot and killed Honeycutt as a
result of a personal vendetta of long standing." ' 2 In Honeycutt v.
Town of Boyce (Honeycutt II),3 the third circuit affirmed this deciprohibited the special medical unit for mentally disturbed prisoners that the Department had planned to locate at Jackson Barracks. See note 127, supra.
129. Some of these difficulties are manifested in the cases cited in note 117, supra.
130. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10.
131. Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976). For an analysis of the
supreme court's decision in Honeycutt, see 1976-1977 Term, supra note 32, at 476-80.
132. Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 366 So. 2d 640, 641 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979). The marshal, who had been convicted of murder for
killing Honeycutt, testified at the trial that the relationship between the two men was
one of "mutual hate" and that the two had often sought to have each other arrested in
various disputes over the years. Baton Rouge, La., Morning Advocate, Jan. 19, 1978, §
B, at 18.
133. 366 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979).
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sion on the ground that the trial court had not committed manifest
error in its factual findings, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied writs.
The third circuit's decision in Honeycutt II is an unexceptional
application of the principle that the trial court's findings of fact are
not normally to be disturbed when the findings have support in the
record."' It should, however, be limited to its unique facts; that is,
situations in which the municipal law enforcement officer is not
engaged in fulfilling his official duties when the misconduct occurs.
It should not be read as limiting a municipality's liability in situations where the officer uses unauthorized force to perform his law
enforcement responsibilities.
Despite the supreme court's 1977 decision in Foster v.
Hampton,3' the identification of the governmental defendant that is
responsible for injuries resulting from the actions of a deputy
sheriff remains a potentially troublesome issue. In Whatley v.
State" a prisoner in the jail of East Baton Rouge Parish sued the
state for injuries that allegedly resulted from a beating administered by a deputy sheriff," 7 and the state filed a third party demand for indemnification against the city-parish government of
Baton Rouge.
The trial court dismissed the third party demand on an exception of no cause of action, and the first circuit affirmed the dismissal
as to the city but reversed with respect to the parish. Although the
appellate court conceded that Foster exempted both cities and
134. In affirming the trial court, the third circuit relied on Canter v. Koehring Co.,
283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973). Since the third circuit's decision in Honeycutt II, the Louisiana Supreme Court has clarified the Canter test but it has not altered the general
principle that appellate courts should not normally overturn the factual findings of the
trial court. See Arceneaux v. Dominigue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978). For a discussion of
the Arceneaux rule, see the civil procedure section of this symposium at pp. - infra.
135. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977). Cf. Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338 (La. App.
4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1108 (La. 1978) (statutory provision governing
employer-employee relationships does not apply to deputy sheriff because the sheriff is
not his employer). For an analysis of the Foster opinion, see 1977-1978 Term, supra
note 14, at 871-79. Following the supreme court's decision in Foster, the plaintiff in
that case amended his petition to add the state as a defendant. In an opinion issued
after the closing date for this year's symposium, the first circuit ruled that the action
against the state had prescribed because the original petition naming the deputy
sheriff (i.e., the state's employee) did not toll the statute of limitations as to the state.
Foster v. Hampton, 372 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
136. 369 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
137. Dictum in Foster suggests that the state is the employer of all deputy sheriffs
in the state. 352 So. 2d at 201-02.
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parishes from vicarious liability for the acts of deputy sheriffs,' 8 it
overruled the exception of no cause of action as to the parish
because of a statutory duty imposed on "[t]he governing authority of
each parish" to "pass all by-laws and regulations they may deem expedient for the police and good government of all jails and prisons in
the parish.""' The Parish of East Baton Rouge had never adopted
any such rules and regulations, and the court found the third party
demand sufficient to raise the question of whether, independently of
the vicarious liability issue, "the Parish may have been guilty of
fault in not adopting the required regulations."'4 0
Whatley wisely deferred the difficult questions of whether the
parish's failure to adopt regulations was fault, whether any such
fault was causally related to the plaintiff's injury, and whether the
parish owed a duty to the plaintiff to adopt regulations, until a more
complete factual record was developed by the trial court. Moreover,
the appellate court's opinion reflects a careful and accurate application of the Foster rationale. Foster merely forbids the imposition of
vicarious liability on the parish for the action of a deputy sheriff. It
does not preclude a finding of an independent basis for parish liability
in situations in which the sheriff's office and the general governing
authority of the parish are jointly responsible; analysis of the liability
of the parish in those situations must await specific factual settings
that clarify the respective responsibilities of the sheriff and the
parish governing authority.
Perhaps the Lousiana Supreme Court's most significant decision
involving tort liability of governmental defendants was Segura v.
Louisiana Architects Selection Board,"' which held the state liable
138. In Foster, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to make a parish liable for
the actions of a deputy sheriff, and the first circuit in Whatley correctly ruled that a
proper application of Foster precluded the imposition of liability on the city as well:
The rationale of the decision is that the office of sheriff is a constitutional office
pursuant to La. Const. 1974, Article 5, Section 27, which exists and functions independently of the parish governing authorities. We apply that same rationale
and hold that cities are likewise not liable vicariously for the actions of deputy
sheriffs.
369 So. 2d at 1127.
139. LA. R.S. 15:702 (1950).
140. 369 So. 2d at 1127.
141. 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978). Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Dixon dissented.
The chief justice filed a dissenting opinion in which he attacked the majority's approach as unwisely "freez[ing] court costs' liability in the constitution, removing it
from legislative authority." 362 So. 2d at 500 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting). Since "Itihe
obligation to provide funds for the court has always been a legislative function," he
concluded that "the legislature has the authority to exempt the state and its agencies
from the payment of court costs and to finance the courts through other means." Id.
Nor did the chief justice interpret the 1974 constitution to change this rule. He argued
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for court costs despite a statute attempting to eliminate the liability
except for court reporting costs. The majority ruled the statute unconstitutional because the "[closts of court are part of the 'liability'
to which a party cast in litigation is subject." ' Since the plaintiff
''was required to advance these costs to the clerks of the courts
through which this litigation progressed," exempting the state from
liability for these costs "would reduce the value of [his award] if he
could not be reimbursed to that extent." 4 ' Thus, the state would be
"relieved of part of its liability," a result that the constitution did
not intend. "4 Although the case involved a judgment against the
state, its rationale undoubtedly applies to local governments as
well."5 In holding the governmental defendant liable for court costs
advanced by the plaintiff in all cases but denying the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees because no statute authorized recovery,'"
the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to be interpreting the 1974 constitution's waiver of tort immunity to require that governmental
defendants be placed in the same posture as private litigants.
The same attitude of treating governmental defendants like
private litigants appeared to guide the two courts of appeal in two
decisions that imposed strict liability on local governmental defenthat the waiver of governmental immunity was not intended to affect the traditional
rules regarding the financing of court; it was merely designed "to give constitutional
status to the principle that the state is amenable to suits on contracts and for injuries
to persons and property without first obtaining the permission of the Legislature." ML,
citing Darville v. Associated Indem. Corp., 323 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
The dissent's defense of the principle of legislative control over court funding appears misguided. The majority opinion does not preclude the legislature from adopting
a new method to provide funds for the courts. Its reach is more limited; since the
legislature has adopted a system of financing courts that normally imposes costs on
the losing party, Segura prevents it from exempting governmental defendants from
that rule and imposing the costs on the prevailing party.
142. 362 So. 2d at 499.
143. Id. The court limited its holding to costs that have been advanced by the
plaintiff:
If other costs not advanced or incurred by Segura are involved, the question
whether clerks of courts, sheriffs and others can collect these costs from the State
is not before us. Our concern is Segura's claim against the State for costs incurred and advanced by him through all phases of this litigation. He is entitled to a
judgment against the State in that amount.
Id.
144. Id.
145. Accord, Durbin v. City of Baton Rouge, 366 So. 2d 1020, 1021-22 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1978).
146. 362 So. 2d at 499-500. Limiting the right to recover attorney's fees to situations where a statute expressly authorizes recovery is a well-established Louisiana
rule for private litigants. See Nassau Realty Co. v. Brown, 332 So. 2d 206 (La. 1976);
Hughes v. Burguieres, 276 So. 2d 267 (La. 1973).
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dants. In Durbin v. City of Baton Rouge,"7 the first circuit affirmed
a judgment holding the city liable for damages the plaintiff suffered
when a large tree limb fell onto her car. The court ruled that the
strict liability rule of Civil Code article 231748 was applicable to the
city; thus, the plaintiff's proof that the tree was rotted was sufficient to establish liability even though "there was no proof that the
defect was apparent or that the city had notice of any defect.""' 9
Although the court acknowledged the existence of "some economic
justifications for exempting governmental agencies" from the rule of
strict liability, it concluded that the task of formulating such exemptions was best left to the legislative process.'50
Although a 1978 decision of the third circuit had refused to apply
the strict liability principle of article 2317 to governmental defendants,'"' that court was willing in Romero v. Town of Welsh'52 to
hold a municipality strictly liable under article 667 for damages a
property owner suffered as the result of an overflow of sewage from
the sewer system owned and operated by the municipality. The
court began its analysis with the principle that "[w]hen a municipality
or governing body undertakes the responsibility of constructing
drains and sewers, it has a duty to provide for the adequate disposal
of accumulated water and sewage"'53 and cited numerous cases
holding municipalities liable for failure to perform this duty.
Although an early decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court 5' had
relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish a
municipality's negligence where sewage had backed up into
147. 366 So. 2d 1020 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
148. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2317 provides in part: "We are responsible, not only for the
damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons
for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody." The
leading recent decision defining the reach of the article with respect to private owners
of trees is Loescher v. Parr,324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). See generally Comment, Does
Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318 and
2321?, 39 LA. L. REV. 207 (1979). A 1977 decision of the first circuit had applied the
strict liability principle of article 2317 in a case involving the state Department of
Highways, American Road Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 354 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 430 (La. 1978), but the third circuit had ruled that article
2317 did not apply to governmental defendants. Gallien v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
353 So. 2d 1127 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978).
149. 366 So. 2d at 1021.
150. Id See also American Road Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 354 So. 2d 656 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 430 (La. 1978).
151. Gallien v. Commerical Union Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1127 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978). See note 148, supra.
152. 370 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
153. Id. at 1289.
154.- Urban Land Co. v. City of Shreveport, 182 La. 978, 162 So. 747 (1935).
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plaintiff's home, the third circuit chose to rely on "[mJore recent
jurisprudence" that "has based responsibility on strict liability
under [Civil Code article] 667."'" 5 Following the lead of the fourth circuit, 56 the court held the municipality "to strict liability for any
damage incurred by a property owner due to the overflow of sewage
[from a municipal sewer system] into a home or business," even
when the plaintiff offered no proof that the municipality had been
negligent in the maintenance of the sewer system."7
The decisions in Romero and Durbin seem consistent with the
spirit of the waiver of liability in the 1974 constitution. The waiver
extends generally to cases involving injury to persons or property;
thus, it seems reasonable to apply all tort principles applicable to
private litigants, whether based on negligence or strict liability, to
governmental defendants. While one may reasonably argue against
the wisdom of such a broad waiver, the decision is one that is appropriately reserved for the political process in a democratic society,
and the inclusive language of the constitutional provision suggests
that the political processes have currently struck the balance in
favor of a broad waiver.
Because Romero involves the operation of a sewer system, it
raises the further question of whether the operation of such a
peculiarly governmental enterprise is an activity that calls for unique
principles of tort liability. The Louisiana appellate courts have been
sensitive to the need for tempering governmental liability with
respect to activities that have no counterpart in the actions of
private individuals," 8 but that concern is applicable here. The duty
for which Romero imposed liability is not a narrow one limited to
the property owners whose property is connected to the municipal
sewer system; it does not create the risk of unlimited liability to the
155. 370 So. 2d at 1289, citing Lombard v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905
(La. 1973); LaCroix v. Travelers Indem. Co., 333 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 So. 2d 112 (La. 1976); Carr v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 So. 2d 527 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 53 (La. 1975); Sharon v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 270
So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 275 So. 2d 788 (La. 1973); Hamilton v.
City of Shreveport, 180 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 700, 181
So. 2d 399 (1966).
156. See Falgout v. St. Charles Sewerage Dist. No. 3, 351 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1978).
157. 370 So. 2d at 1289.
158. See, e.g., Perret v. City of Westwego, 364 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978)
(city's failure to create a housing board of appeals as authorized by local ordinance did
not render the city liable for damages allegedly suffered by individual citizens);
Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 1069
(La. 1977) (negligent fire inspection of private business would not render city liable to
patron subsequently injured in a fire at the establishment).
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general public. Moreover, the effect of the decision is to spread the
risk of a sewer backup among all users of the system by making
damages from a backup a cost that the system must bear, and that
seems an efficient risk distribution policy.

